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INTRODUCTION
Kelley brought this action seeking a declaratory judgmer

f :;he parties' respective xiyhLw and \ih 1 :i .'|.il ion1- u• u.1*•! m\
agreement

performance of the Agreement

(the " Agreement* i ana specific
The trial court granted specific

performance, the parties set.I It** I I hi t eitidlni ug issues, unci h i.i"st
Security accepted Kelley" s money and gave Kelley deeds to the
property

See R, 815-24.

Kelley's tender of perfc

:

The only issue or appeal was whether
•

-..--.

:-xeby precluding

specific performance.
REPLY T O LEUCADIA'S STATEMENT OF FACTS
Certain portions of Leucadia's statement of fact :» die
nr misleading:

r
Par
certain terms

^eucadia's statement of facts paraphrases
' •

for Itsel f
the terms
See Utah :

- areement.

Obi 10 isl<

I he Agreement speaks

extent that Leucadia's paraphrases misstate
t the Agreement, they should be ignored or stricken.*
. ,..

*.

1
Leucadia claims that the Agreement was
For exampXe#
"conditioned o n " First Security furnishing good and marketable
title to the Property. In fact, the provision with respect to
the "Condition and Conveyance of Title" makes the obligation
"to furnish good and marketable title" a covenant and not a condition.
R. 185. £ £ . Barnes v. Wood, 750 P.2d 1226, 1232-33
(Utah Ct. App. 1988) (the law overwhelmingly favors the construction of ambiguous contract provisions as covenants as opposed
to conditions precedent).
- 1-

Leucadia states that both Kelley and First Security
understood that the property was enclosed "by fences, a stream,
a spring and a pond," and that, as a result of the erroneous
property description, the boundaries shifted so that "neither
the spring, the stream, nor the pond" would be included in the
conveyance.
problem.

In fact, the pond was not part of the boundary

It was in front of the house and was not affected by

the shift in boundaries. See R. 143, 194-96, 258-59 & 276. Thus,
this is not simply a case of a title defect. There were several
problems with the property—the boundary problem, the question
of water rights, and damage to property that was clearly part
of the Agreement regardless of the location of the boundaries.
Leucadia claims that

,f

[i]t became clear" that the ad-

jacent land owners (the Armstrongs) would not resolve these problems without substantial litigation and that First Security
told Kelley that "resolution of the boundary dispute and property
damage could not be done through negotiation."

It cites to First

Security's September 4, 1987, letter for both of these propositions.

That letter does not say that the problems cannot be

resolved through negotiation or without substantial litigation.
Rather, it simply states that

"First Security is no longer

desirous of pursuing the lawsuit with the Armstrongs" and claims
that "First Security has never viewed itself as having the ob-

- 2 -

ligation to clear title, nor does the earnest money agreement
provide for that obligation."

R. 115.

Leucadia states that,

"[a]t Kelley's request, the

closing date was extended until September 22, 1987."

Although

Kelley requested more time to close, he did not set the date of
September 22, 1987. First Security did. And it was untraversed
that, under the circumstances, September 22 provided an unreasonably short time for Kelley to close.

See R. 278-80.

Leucadia claims that, on September 22, 1987, Kelley
"declined to close under either of the agreed-upon options
. . . required by the Agreement" and instead tendered his payment
"conditioned on First Security resolving the boundary dispute,
rectifying the property damage, and clearing title prior to
closing."

In fact, the letter of Kelley's counsel clearly

states, "This tender is conditioned only upon First Security
honoring its obligations pursuant to the Earnest Money Sales
Agreement and delivering the property free from those defects
which it has undertaken to cure."

R. 120.

Kelley and First

Security clearly differed as to whether First Security had an
obligation to resolve the problems with the property.
why Kelley had to file this action.

That is

It was for the court, not

First Security, to say what First Security's obligations were
under the Agreement and what Kelley's options were.

- 3 -

Leucadia claims that First Security offered to extend
the closing date to October 8, 1987, if Kelley would purchase
the property "as is."2 What Leucadia does not say is that First
Security's "as is" did not mean that First Security would give
Kelley the property in the condition it was in when the Agreement
was made but in the condition it was in in September 1987, that
is, with the water cut off, the pond dry and the fish gone, even
though all the damage to the property occurred at a time when
First Security bore all risk of loss due to vandalism.3
17 5 P.

See R.

Leucadia also fails to say that even after Kelley de-

clined this offer First Security continued to treat the Agreement
as in effect.

See, e.g., R. 283.

Leucadia claims that First Security executed a release
of Kelley's earnest money deposit on September 24, 1987.

The

release, however, was expressly conditioned on Kelley's agreement to the release, and Kelley did not agree.

R. 125.

Leucadia states that it entered into a binding Earnest
Money Sales Agreement with First Security on November 2, 1987,
2
Leucadia neglects to mention that First Security's
offer was also conditioned on Kelley giving First Security a
complete release of all claims he may have had against it. See
Deposition of Wayne L. Lantz (R. 911) at 128.
3
First Security's definition of "as is" also extended
to the condition of title, R. 117, negating First Security's
contractual obligation to convey good and marketable title by
special warranty deed. See R. 185. The Utah Court of Appeals
has since rejected such a construction of "as is." See BreuerHarrison. Inc. v. Combe, 799 P.2d 716, 727 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
- 4 -

and that, on November 25, 1987, the property was sold to Leucadia.
It neglects to mention, however, that the sale was made subject
to the lis pendens that Kelley filed, placing Leucadia on notice
of this action and Kelleyfs claim to the property.

R. 33l.4

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Leucadia

does

not dispute

that Kelley

September 22, 1987, to tender his performance.

had until

E.g., Brief of

Respondent at 9, 33, 35. Nor does Leucadia dispute that Kelley
tendered his performance on September 22, 1987. id. at 25, 33.
Leucadia claims, however, that Kelley's tender was defective
because he refused to waive title defects and insisted that First
Security resolve the issues of title defects and water rights
before closing.
Leucadia's

arguments

ignore

the context

in which

Kelley's tender was made. The parties to a contract had a goodfaith dispute over their respective rights and obligations under
the contract.

Kelley had the right to ask a court to resolve

the dispute. By doing so, he did not lose his right to specific
performance.

(Point I.)

4

Any suggestion that Leucadia was somehow injured by
the court's decree of specific performance is put to rest by
the terms of Leucadia's contract with First Security, which provided that Leucadia would take the property subject to Kelley's
lawsuit and required First Security to indemnify Leucadia completely and return its money with interest (at the prime rate)
if Kelley was successful. See R. 510-14.
- 5 -

Moreover, Kelley's tender was not defective.

Kelley

was not required to waive title defects by September 22, 1987,
so his alleged failure to waive defects did not make his tender
defective (point II). Any condition imposed on his tender did
not make the tender defective (point III). Even under Leucadia's
position, Kelly's tender was timely (point V).

If Kelley's tender

were untimely or defective, any defect is irrelevant because
his tender was excused (point IV).
Finally, even if the court of appeals were otherwise
correct, it erred by directing entry of judgment in favor of
Leucadia (point VI).
ARGUMENT
I.
LEUCADIA HAS ERRED BY FOCUSING EXCLUSIVELY ON
KELLEY'S TENDER LETTER, WHICH IT HAS TAKEN OUT
OF CONTEXT,
Leucadia does not dispute that Kelley tendered his
performance. See, e.g., Brief of Respondent at 25, 33. It claims
only that Kelley's tender was defective because it was conditional
on First Security providing a remedy not required by the Agreement.
All of Leucadiars arguments are based on Kelley's tender
letter of September 22, 1987. That letter stated:
This tender is conditioned only upon First
Security honoring its obligations pursuant
to the Earnest Money Sales Agreement and
- 6 -

delivering the property free from those defects which it has undertaken to cure. Mr.
Kelley further requests that First Security
resolve the issue regarding the water rights
to the pond immediately in front of the home.
R. 61.
The main problem with Leucadia's arguments is their
tunnel vision. They focus solely on this provision of the letter
and ignore, not only all of Kelley's other actions, but also
First Security's actions that prompted the letter.

Leucadia

stands in the shoes of First Security and cannot have any better
rights than First Security would have. Yet it has tried to distance itself from First Security's actions.

The September 22

tender letter must be read in context, and, so read, it was an
appropriate response to First Security's actions.
The parties had originally agreed to close the sale
on April 20, 1987.5

However, before April 20 First Security had

discovered a boundary error, which it undertook to cure by filing
a quiet title action against the neighboring landowners, the
Armstrongs.

See R. 23-36. Kelley and First Security agreed to

three extensions of the closing date—twice after the agreed
dates had expired—while First Security tried to remedy the problem.

R. 19-21.

In the meantime, the Armstrongs tore out water

lines and cut off water to the property, causing the main pond
5
Leucadia states that the parties extended the closing
date to April 20, 1987. Brief of Respondent at 4-5. In fact,
that was the original closing date. See R. 18.
- 7 -

to dry up.

R. 31, 45, 50-52.

Throughout this period, First

Security assured Kelley, who lived in Massachusetts, that it
was taking care of the problems and that he did not need to hire
an attorney.

R. 289.

About the time the last extension was to expire, Leucadia entered the picture.

It offered to purchase the property

for more money, see R. 493, giving First Security a better deal
than it had with Kelley and an easy way out of the lawsuit it
had started to clear title. So on September 4, 1987, when Kelley
was expecting the usual thirty-day extension, First Security
wrote Kelley to say that he had until September 15 either to
close or to "walk away from the deal."

R. 115.

First Security

did not say that title to the property could not be insured.**
Nor did First Security say that it had done all it could reasonably be expected to do to try to clear title and had been unable
to do so.

Rather, First Security claimed it had "never viewed

itself as having the obligation to clear title" and said it was
simply "no longer desirous of pursuing the lawsuit with the Armstrongs."

R. 115. First Security recognized that Kelley needed

to review the legal issues involved "to make a fully informed
judgment."

It encouraged Kelley to obtain legal counsel and

offered to cooperate with Kelley's chosen counsel*

R. 115.

6
In fact, at the time the trial court entered its Partial
Summary Judgment, R. 562, there was not even any evidence in
the record of a preliminary commitment for title insurance.
- 8 -

In response to this letter, Kelley wired back, "Will
not walk away. Based on history, need normal 30-day extension."
R. 294.

Kelley also retained counsel, who made an appointment

with First Security's counsel to review the documents concerning
the boundary and water problems, but First Security's counsel
failed to keep the appointment.

In fact, First Security did

not provide Kelley with all the necessary documents until October
15, 1987.

R. 283.
Because Kelley did not even receive First Security's

September 4 letter until September 8, First Security extended
its deadline to September 22, 1987.

R. 117-18.

At that time,

Kelley had not seen any closing documents, had not been given
the information necessary to evaluate the boundary and water
problems and only knew that First Security claimed it had no
obligation under the Agreement to try to remedy the problems.'
Under these circumstances, Kelley did the only thing
he could do. On September 22, 1987, First Security's unilaterally
imposed deadline, Kelley tendered his performance, "conditioned

7

First Security was also claiming that it would sell
the property to Kelley "'as is' without warranty." R. 114, yet,
even under First Security's definition of "as is," see supra,
note 3, it was clear that First Security was not prepared to
give Kelley the property in the condition it was in at the time
the Agreement was made. At the time the Agreement was made,
the property included a full trout pond. By September 22, 1987,
the water to the pond had been cut off, and the pond had been
emptied. See R. 50-52, 61.
- 9 -

only on First Security honoring its obligations pursuant to the
Earnest Money Sales Agreement," R. 61, and he filed this action,
Leucadia now argues that, by asking First Security to
clear title, as it had undertaken to do, Kelley somehow lost
his right to buy the property. All the evidence shows that Kelley
wanted to buy the property and refused to walk away from the
deal.

The evidence also shows that Kelley refused to accept

First Security's unsupported assertion that it had no obligation
to try to clear title or correct the problems relating to water
rights and vandalism.
What this case comes down to is a dispute between the
parties to a contract over their respective rights and obligations
under the contract.8

It is undisputed that Kelley timely tendered

his performance, "conditioned only upon First Security honoring
y

The Agreement was essentially a form contract, the
relevant provisions of which had never been interpreted by Utah
appellate courts. Leucadia claims that the parties "bargained
for" its terms. Brief of Respondent at 5. With the exception
of the provision that the property was to be sold ,f/as is' without
warranty" and the provision requiring a current certified survey
of the property, all of the terms Leucadia cites were part of a
preprinted, standard form earnest money sales agreement approved
by the Utah Real Estate Commission. The implication that, at
the time they entered into the Agreement, the parties considered
the problems that later arose and "bargained for" the remedies
Leucadia claims are exclusive is belied by the testimony of Wayne
L. Lantz, who negotiated the deal on behalf of First Security.
Mr. Lantz testified that, had the parties "known of the ambiguity
in the property description, we would not have signed the Earnest
Money Agreement without specifically addressing that issue and
thereby ensuring that Mr. Kelley understood that he was taking
the property subject to the ambiguity in the description." R.
686 I 10.
• 10 -

its obligations pursuant to the [Agreement] and delivering the
property free from those defects which it has undertaken to cure."
R. 61. First Security claimed it had no such obligation. Kelley
thought it did.

Consequently, he filed this action to ask the

court to declare the parties' respective rights and obligations
under the Agreement and to enforce the Agreement according to
its terms.^

By filing this action, Kelley made an irrevocable

election to enforce the Agreement. See Salt Lake City v. Industrial Comm'n, 81 Utah 213, 220-21, 17 P.2d 239, 242-43 (1932);
Cook v. Covev-Ballard Motor Co., 69 Utah 161, 169, 253 P. 196
(1927); Howard v. J.P. Paulson Co., 41 Utah 490, 495, 127 P. 284
(1912).

He paid his money into court and had no right to get

it back.10

If Kelley was not entitled both to specific perfor-

mance and to the other relief he sought, then the appropriate
response would have been to deny Kelley the other relief.

But

y

Leucadia claims that Kelley requested "an order of
the Court that First Security was obligated to resolve the boundary dispute, repair or replace the property, and then convey
the property to Kelley," Brief of Respondent at 10 (emphasis
added), suggesting that Kelley would not take the property with
the problems unresolved. In fact, Kelley's Complaint asked for
a judgment interpreting the Agreement, R. 6-7, and "a decree of
specific performance requiring First Security to convey the
Subject Property to him as contracted in the [Agreement] as interpreted by the Court's Order."
R. 7-8 (emphasis added).
Clearly, if the court held that First Security had no obligation
to remedy the problemsf Kelley would have to take the property
with the problems unresolved.
10
Thus, First Security suffered no damage as a result
of Kelley's filing this action.
- 11 -

the parties settled their remaining claims, thereby mooting that
issue.
Nevertheless, Leucadia would have this Court hold that,
by asking a court to resolve the dispute, Kelley lost his right
to enforce the Agreement.

That has never been the law of this

state, and the Court should not make it so now.
II.
KELLEY WAS NOT REQUIRED TO WAIVE TITLE DEFECTS
BEFORE TENDERING HIS PERFORMANCE.
Leucadia argues that Kelley's refusal to waive claims
regarding title defects and property damage in his September
22, 1987, tender letter, caused the Agreement to terminate by
its own terms.

Leucadia relies primarily on paragraph H of the

Agreement, regarding title insurance.^

That paragraph states:

If title insurance is elected, Seller authorizes the Listing Brokerage to order a preliminary commitment for a standard form ALTA
policy of title insurance to be issued by
such title insurance company as Seller shall
designate. Title policy to be issued shall
contain no exceptions other than those provided for in said standard form, and the encumbrances or defects excepted under the
final contract of sale. If title cannot be
made so insurable through an escrow agreement
at closing, the earnest money shall, unless
Buyer elects to waive such defects or en11

Leucadia also mentions paragraph G. However, as the
court of appeals correctly noted, paragraph G does not require
the buyer to waive title defects. It merely gives him the option
of terminating the agreement, and "Kelley refused to accept this
option." Slip op. at 3.
- 12 -

cumbrances, be refunded to Buyer, and this
Agreement shall thereupon be terminated.
Seller agrees to pay any cancellation charge.
R. 15.
Paragraph H was obviously meant for the buyer's benefit.
If the buyer cannot obtain title insurance, paragraph H gives
the buyer the option of waiving unexcepted defects and encumbrances or getting his earnest money back.

The question is,

When was Kelley required to make that election?
Under the terms of paragraph H, Kelley's alleged obligation to waive title defects or walk away from the deal could
not even arise until there had been a preliminary commitment
for title insurance that contained exceptions other than those
provided for in a standard form ALTA title insurance policy.
First Security introduced no evidence in the trial court of any
preliminary commitment for title insurance, let alone a standard
form ALTA policy, because it never claimed that paragraph H precluded Kelley's claim for specific performance.

Because there

was no evidence that paragraph H even applied, the trial court
properly ignored paragraph H in holding that Kelley was entitled
to specific performance.^
*2
Leucadia has not disputed the fact that there was never
any showing—either before or after this action was filed—that
any of the conditions precedent to Kelley's obligation to elect
his remedy under paragraph H had been met. It simply claims
that there was "no factual issue in that regard."
Brief of
Respondent at 40. That is because First Security, whose burden
it was to prove that paragraph H applied, did not even argue
- 13 -

Even if Kelley were required to waive defects under
paragraph H or walk away from the deal, Kelley was not required
to make his election before September 22, 1987, when he elected
to enforce the Agreement by filing this action.
Leucadia

claims

that

First

Security's

letter

of

September 4, 1987, triggered Kelley's duty to elect under paragraph H.13

BUt that argument ignores the terms of that letter.

First Security did not claim that its obligations were excused
under paragraph H.^^ It did not claim that it had tried to obtain
a title insurance policy and that no policy could be issued without the standard exceptions. Nor did it claim that it had exercised reasonable diligence to clear title and had been unable
to do so. It simply said it was "no longer desirous" of pursuing
the actions it had already undertaken to correct the problems
that paragraph H applied, let alone introduce any evidence to show
that it applied.
1J

At one point, Leucadia suggests that Kelley was required to make an election once the title defects became known.
Brief of Respondent at 26. But First Security's own actions
belie this argument, since it waited more than four months after
first discovering the problems and extended the closing date
three times before it ever claimed that Kelley was required to
close.
14
The only contract provision First Security even mentioned was the provision that the property was "sold 'as is'
without warranty." Leucadia has not disputed that, as Kelley
has shown, that provision referred to the physical condition or
habitability of the property and not to any warranties of title.
Compare Brief of Petitioner at 26-28, with Brief of Respondent
at 30.
. 14 -

with the property and that it "never viewed itself as having
the obligation to clear title." R. 114-15. That was insufficient
to trigger Kelley's election of remedy under paragraph H.
Moreover, under any construction of paragraph H, Kelley
was entitled to a reasonable time to evaluate his options and
elect his remedy.

The undisputed evidence showed that First

Security's unilateral deadline of September 22, 1987, did not
provide Kelley a reasonable time to make an informed decision.
See infra pt. V.
But even if Kelley were required to waive title defects
or walk away from the deal by September 22, 1987, as Leucadia
claims, the evidence shows that Kelley unequivocally refused to
walk away from the deal.

Kelley responded to First Security's

letter with a mailgram stating, "Will not walk away."

R. 294.

He did not accept First Security's offer to return his earnest
money.

R. 125. And on September 22, 1987f he tendered his per-

formance1^ and filed this action to specifically enforce the
Agreement, thereby electing his remedy.

See, e.g., Salt Lake

City v- Industrial Comm'n, 81 Utah 213, 17 P.2d 239, 242-43
(1932).

If Kelley's only options were to waive defects or walk

away from the deal, he clearly chose not to walk away from the
deal.

One would have to conclude from this evidence that, as a

15

The sufficiency of Kelley's tender is discussed infra,

pt. III.
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matter of law, Kelley waived any defects or was estopped from
claiming damages for defects.1**
Leucadia argues that the September 22, 1987, letter
from Kelley's counsel "was clearly and unequivocally a refusal
to waive title defects."

Brief of Respondent at 12.

But the

September 22 letter must be read in conjunction with First
Security's letters of September 4 and September 17, which prompted
the September 22 letter.

The fact that Kelley asked First

Security to deliver the property free from those defects it had
undertaken to cure and to resolve the issue of water rights does
not mean that Kelley refused to waive those defects.

It merely

means that he refused to waive them based solely on First
Security's unilateral (and erroneous) assertion that it had no
obligation under the contract to try to resolve the problems.
III.
KELLEY'S TENDER OF PERFORMANCE WAS NOT DEFECTIVE.
Leucadia next argues that Kelley's failure to make an
unconditional tender of performance precludes specific performance.

It claims that Kelley's tender was defective because it

was conditioned on First Security undertaking obligations that
16
ffhe proper response for First Security would then
have been to ask the court to deny Kelley's claim for damages.
But it did not. Instead, after the trial court granted Kelley
specific performance and reserved the question of damages, First
Security settled Kelley's damage claim, thereby mooting any question of whether Kelley was entitled to both specific performance
and damages.
- 16 -

were not required by the Agreement.
letter states,

In fact, Kelley's tender

"This tender is conditioned only upon First

Security honoring its obligations pursuant to the Earnest Money
Sales Agreement and delivering the property free from those defects which it has undertaken to cure." R. 61 (emphasis added).
A tender conditioned only on the other party keeping its part
of the deal does not make a tender defective.

See, e.g., Kodiak

Island Borough v. Large. 622 P.2d 440, 448 (Alaska 1981); Burke
Aviation Corp. v. Alton Jennings Co., 377 P.2d 578, 581 (Okla.
1962); Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. Smith, 637 P.2d 1020, 1023
(Wyo. 1981).
Leucadia claims that Kelley had no right to insist
that First Security deliver title to the property free from the
defects it had undertaken to cure because the Agreement did not
set forth such an obligation. Similarly, Leucadia suggests that
Kelley had no right under the Agreement to insist that First
Security remedy any property damage caused by vandalism.17
17

Paragraph P of the Agreement states:

All risk of loss or damage to the property shall be
borne by the Seller until closing. In the event there
is loss or damage to the property between the date
hereof and the date of closing, by reason of fire,
vandalism, flood, earthquake, or acts of God, and the
cost to repair such damage shall exceed ten percent
(10%) of the purchase price of the property, Buyer
may, at his option either proceed with this transaction
if Seller agrees in writing to repair or replace damaged
property prior to closing, or declare this Agreement
null and void.
If damage to property is less than
- 17 -

But

a contracting party has obligations in addition to those expressly
set forth in the contract. An obligation of good faith and fair
dealing "adheres in every contractual relation." Leiah Furniture
& Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 306 (Utah 1982).

First

Security's express contractual obligation to "furnish good and
marketable title" carried with it the implied obligation to clear
the title if it could be done by the exercise of reasonable diligence. Lanaston v. Huff acker, 36 Wash. App. 779, 678 P.2d 1265,
1271 (1984); Ace Realty, Inc. v. Loonev, 531 P.2d 1377, 1380
(Okla. 1974).

Similarly, First Security had an implied con-

tractual obligation to act in good faith to try to remedy any
property damage.
Before the provisions of paragraph H and P could apply,
First Security was required to show that it had met its implied

ten percent (10%) of the purchase price and Seller
agrees in writing to repair or replace and does actually
repair and replace damaged property prior to closing,
this transaction shall proceed as agreed.
R. 17. Leucadia admits that paragraph P "does not clearly state
the remedy available to a purchaser in the event the seller refuses to repair or replace property damage caused by vandalism."
Brief of Respondent at 12 n.3. Leucadia claims, however, that
"the only reasonable interpretation of the Paragraph is that
the Agreement terminates unless the purchaser waives property
damage claims." id. In other words, under "the only reasonable
interpretation" of paragraph P, even though the seller bears
all risk of loss before closing, simply by not agreeing in
writing to repair or replace damaged property, the seller can
avoid the sale or deprive the buyer of any remedy for property
damage, no matter how minor. Kelley interpreted the Agreement
differently.
- 18 -
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KELLEY # S TENDER OF PERFORMANCE WAS EXCUSED.
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tendered its performance and in

fact repudiated its obligations under the Agreement, thereby
excusing Kelley's tender.
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Leucadia argues that First Security's tender was not
required because First Security was not the one seeking to enforce
the Agreement, Kelley was.

Yet Leucadia claims that First

Security's September 4 letter required Kelley to elect between
waiving defects or walking away from the deal.

So under Leu-

cadia's own theory, by trying to trigger Kelley's alleged duty
to elect, First Security was trying to enforce the Agreement,
that is, to cause its alleged election of remedy provision to
take effect,
Leucadia also argues that First Security did not repudiate its obligations under the Agreement because the Agreement
did not expressly require First Security to clear title.

But

the contractual obligation to convey clear title carries with
it the implied obligation to clear title if it can be done in
the exercise of reasonable diligence. Ace Realty, Inc. v. Loonev,
531 P.2d 1377, 1380 (Okla. 1975); Lanaston v. Huffacker, 36 Wash.
App. 779, 678 P.2d 1265, 1271 (1984).18

Leucadia tries to dis-

tinguish Lanaston on the grounds that the court "essentially concluded" that the seller had acted in bad faith in not clearing
title*

Brief of Respondent at 28.

18

In fact, the trial court in

First Security never claimed it had met its obligation.
It claimed it had no obligation and was simply not interested
in pursuing the Armstrong action. First Security's lack of interest at best constituted subjective impossibility, which did
not excuse it from conveying clear title. Carcione v. Clark.
96 Nev. 808, 618 P.2d 346, 348 (1980).
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contention that the purchaser had lost the right to enforce the
contract."

531 P.2d at 1380-

Similarly, in this case, First

Security did not claim it was unable to clear title but simply
that it had no obligation to do so. The Oklahoma court rejected
such an argument, noting that it "would give the vendor the potential right and power to take advantage of his own wrong."

Id.

at 1381. By the same token, First Security should not have been
the final arbiter of its obligations under the Agreement. Kelley
was entitled to ask a court whether First Security had an obligation to try to clear title and whether or not it had complied
with its obligations under the Agreement.
Leucadia also argues that there was no indication that
First Security was the cause of the problems or acted in bad
faith and that, in fact, First Security did exercise reasonable
diligence to clear title and was unable to do so.

On the other

hand, there was no evidence that First Security had exercised
reasonable diligence to clear title and was unable to do so.
The only evidence was that First Security had undertaken an action
to correct the problems and then decided it was "no longer desirous" of pursuing the action. First Security did not claim that
it had exercised reasonable diligence to clear title; it simply
claimed it never had any obligation to try to clear title.

In

other words, it repudiated its implied contractual obligation
of good faith and fair dealing, thereby excusing Kelley's tender.
- 22 -
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to waive? title defects before enforcing the Agreement.
V.
KELLEY WAS ENTITLED TO A REASONABLE TIME WITHIN
WHICH TO PERFORM, AND HE TENDERED HIS PERFORMANCE
WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME,
Leucadia claims that the "time of » in . • i nu

. I .ise

of the Agreement r>»ns**H fhi..» "qreemeni. t.o terminate Dy its own
Lfcjiiu.

ri September 2 2 , 1987, precluding specific performance.

That provision states:
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In the event that this sale cannot be
closed by the date provided herein due to
interruption of transport, strikes, fire,
flood, extreme weather, governmental regulations, acts of God, or similar occurrences
beyond the control of Buyer or Seller, then
the closing date shall be extended seven
(7) days beyond cessation of such condition,
but in no event more than thirty (30) days
beyond the closing date provided herein.
Thereafter, time is of the essence. This
provision relates only to the extension of
closing date. "Closing" shall mean the date
on which all necessary instruments are signed
and delivered by all parties to the transaction.
R. 17 1 Q.
Paragraph Q makes time of the essence only after there
has been a delay in closing due to some force majeure.
was no such occurrence in this case.

There

Therefore, the "time is

of the essence" provision did not apply.
Even if the Agreement made time of the essence, the
parties waived that requirement by their conduct. They repeatedly
extended the closing date, twice after it had already expired.
Even First Security did not treat the Agreement as if it had
expired on August 31, 1987, the last agreed closing date. Under
these circumstances, any requirement that time was of the essence
was waived. E.g. . Huck v. Haves, 560 P.2d 1124, 1126 (Utah 1977);
Schwoyer v. Fenstermacher, 251 Pa. Super. 243, 380 A.2d 468,
470 (1977); Cline v. Hullum, 435 P.2d 152, 156 (Okla. 1967).
The contract therefore continued in effect.

Century 21 All

Western Real Estate & Investment, Inc. v. Webb, 645 P.2d 52, 55
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Finally, even I f September 22, 3 987, were the bewitching
hour, Kelley took appropriate action on September 22, 1987: He
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tendered his performance (conditioned only on First Security
fulfilling its part of the deal),20

anci

he filed this action

to enforce the Agreement according to its terms.
VI.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DIRECTING THAT
JUDGMENT BE ENTERED IN FAVOR OF LEUCADIA.
Leucadia argues that the court of appeals properly
directed that judgment be entered for Leucadia because there
were no factual disputes to be resolved on remand. Kelley agrees
that there were no factual disputes before the trial court that
would have precluded summary judgment for Kelley.

But the court

of appeals reversed that summary judgment based on a contract
provision that was never raised in the trial court. If the court
of appeals properly decided the appeal based on paragraph H,
then there existed disputed factual issues that precluded entry
of judgment in favor of Leucadia.
Leucadia claims that there was no factual dispute that
title was not insurable.

In fact, there was no evidence with

respect to title insurance at all—no preliminary commitment,

20

As shown supra, pt. Ill, Kelley's tender was not defective because conditional. The only "condition" he imposed was
that First Security comply with its obligations under the Agreement.
It was only because First Security insisted it had no
obligation that Kelley had to file this action.
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d i r e c t i n g judgment for Leucadia.
Leucadia also claims that
i'»•'llt>y f *' i LIM 'i I i

LIUM

*••

*MI, I i

w a i v e title d e f e c t s .

Waiver

|uest. ion

'

is generall;

q u e s t i o n of fact or at least a mixed q u e s t i o n o f l a w a n d fact.
See Loftis v. Pacific M u t , Lite Ins , Cu, . J'« I" >Ii "''IP1, V ',

«l

"IJ| I "' 9 1 I ) . T h e only evidence w a s that Kelley refused
to walk away from the dea.
that

it ii

That *c ^

mut- ai

Kellev w e r e required
t'v i

*• accept First Security's assertion

IIHIICM

, refuse.

r

< waive *

li)f:«!, oi f-,» I In-1 i

J

f title defects
defects
o waeX,

in ill 'L"uu

no whether or n o t he refused t. -*<:

* evidence

defects w a s a t best a m -

b i g u o u s , p r e c l u d i n g judgment for liem "rut i -n,
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Title could be insurable if, for example, there was a
title I nsurance company that was wi 11 i ng to insure over any problem.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the court
of appeals should be reversed and the judgment of the district
court affirmed.
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